the cooperative outcome, because cooperation is a weakly dominant strategy independent of the decision rule and the number …

that the larger the gains of full cooperation, the larger the cooperation. However, in the second case, the unique stable … agreement we find consists of three countries regardless of the gains of full cooperation. These results suggest that … complementarity can play in favor of cooperation but that it is not a sufficient condition to obtain more participation in an emission …

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international … cooperation on GHG emission reductions. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, a three-stage technology agreement formation …

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international … cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to … spillover effects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, an agreement formation game is …

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international … cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to … spillover effects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, an agreement formation game is …

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international … cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to … cooperation, an agreement formation game is solved in three stages. First, countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement …