This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of concentrated ownership and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate wealth from...

This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems arising from different types of controlling shareholders. In a context of ownership concentration and poor investor protection, controlling shareholders can easily expropriate minority...

Family businesses are an important part of the world economy (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) and show significant differences in their corporate governance compared to non-family firms. Although displaying evident unique features, family firms have received relatively little attention as distinct from...

This paper examines how two prominent corporate governance models, namely the shareholder and stakeholder models, have different effects on the relation between agency conflicts and the supply, and demand of audit services. Shareholder (stakeholder) countries rely heavily on public (private)...

Author's abstract. This study examines whether auditors are employed as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (named Type II agency conflict). In a context of ownership concentration and poor investor protection, controlling...

This study examines the behavior of auditors, considered as a monitoring mechanism, in the presence of a principal-principal agency conflict in a common-law country. Following the surprising findings of Holderness (2009) about ownership concentration of U.S firms, we examine ownership structure...