We provide an introduction to interactive belief systems from a qualitative and semantic point of view. Properties of belief hierarchies are formulated locally. Among the properties considered are "Common belief in no error" (which has been shown to have important game theoretic applications),...

The logical foundations of game-theoretic solution concepts have so far been developed within the confines of epistemic logic. In this paper we turn to a different branch of modal logic, namely temporal logic, and propose to view the solution of a game as a complete prediction about future play....

We give an introduction to the literature on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts in game theory. Only normal-form games are considered. The solution concepts analyzed are rationalizability, strong rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. The analysis is carried...

The "Harsanyi Doctrine" asserts that differences in individuals' beliefs are to be attributed entirely to differences in information. In its embodiment as a Common Prior assumption it is central to the economics of information and the foundations of game theory. This paper attempts to provide a...

Aumann (1976) put forward a formal definition of common knowledge and used it to prove that two "like minded" individuals cannot "agree to disagree" in the following sense. If they start from a common prior and update the probability of an event E (using Bayes' rule) on the basis of private...

We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and beliefs in game theory. We focus on recent results on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts, including correlated equilibrium, rationalizability in dynamic games, forward and backward induction.