The literature on competitive effects of common ownership has grown at a fast rate in the past two years. Anticompetitive effects have been confirmed with alternative reduced-form and structural estimation methods, in different industries, geographies and jurisdictions. Multiple independent...

This paper establishes a new empirical fact: mutual funds' flow-performance sensitivity is a hump-shaped function of aggregate risk-factor realizations. Explanations based on extant theories can only explain a fraction of the pattern. We thus develop a new parsimonious model. It assumes Bayesian...

Motivated by individuals' emotional response to risk at different time horizons, we model an 'anxious' agent - one who is more risk averse with respect to imminent risks than distant risks. Such preferences describe well-documented features of 1) individual behavior, 2) equilibrium prices, and...

We survey the literature on payout policy, with a particular emphasis on developments in the last two decades. Of the traditional motives of why firms pay out (agency, signaling, and taxes), the cross-sectional empirical evidence is most persuasive in favor of agency considerations. Studies...

We provide a preference-based rationale for endogenous overconfidence. Horizon-dependent risk aversion, combined with a possibility to forget, can generate overconfidence and excessive risk taking in equilibrium. An "anxiety prone" agent, who is more risk-averse to imminent than to distant...

Over 40% of firms that make payouts also raise capital during the same year, resulting in 31% of aggregate share repurchases and dividends being externally financed, primarily with debt. Most externally financed payouts are the result of firms persistently setting payouts above free cash flow....

This paper shows that collateral constraints restrict firm entry and post-entry growth, even in the long-run. We use French administrative data and exploit cross-sectional variation in local house-price appreciation as shocks to the value of collateral available to homeowners. We control for...