Koopmans gyakorlati problémák megoldása során szerzett tapasztalatait általánosítva fogott hozzá a lineáris tevékenységelemzési modell kidolgozásához. Meglepődve tapasztalta, hogy a korabeli közgazdaságtan nem rendelkezett egységes, kellően egzakt termeléselmélettel és...

Rationing occurs if the demand for a certain good exceeds its supply. In such situations a rationing method has to be specified in order to determine the allocation of the scarce good to the agents. Moulin (1999) introduced the notion of probabilistic rationing methods for the discrete...

It is often assumed (for analytical convenience, but also in accordance with common intuition) that consumer preferences are convex. In this paper, we consider circumstances under which such preferences are (or are not) optimal. In particular, we investigate a setting in which goods possess some...

We will investigate the amount of residual demand in a market consisting of only one consumer and two producers. Since there is only one consumer, we cannot really speak about a rationing rule, but we can ask ourselves whether a known rationing rule reflects the consumer’s utility maximizing...

This paper extends the Bertrand-Edgeworth price-setting game with finitely many firms to a game with infinitely many firms. Taking a market with one significant firm and a nonatomic fringe, we present a microfoundation of dominant-firm price leadership.

A tanulmány a variációszámítás gazdasági alkalmazásaiból ismertet hármat. Mindhárom alkalmazás a Leontief-modellen alapszik. Az optimális pályák vizsgálata után arra keressük a választ, hogy az Euler–Lagrange-differenciálegyenlet rendszerrel kapott megoldások valóban...

We show that in a simple price-setting game with one large firm and many small firms the large firm does not accept the role of the price leader.

This article is searching for necessary and sufficient conditions which are to be imposed on the demand curve to guarantee the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints.