This paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions hit by aggregate shocks. In particular, it shows that competitive financial contracts can result in excessive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post. Even though, from a...

We explore an inconsistency in the Basel Committee's Internal Ratings Based (IRB) rules: the IRB rules on corporate loans were calibrated to loan-level data, while the IRB rules on small business loans were calibrated with little, if any, information on small business loans. We argue that the...

We explore an inconsistency in the Basel Committee's Internal Ratings Based (IRB) rules: the IRB rules on corporate loans were calibrated to loan-level data, while the IRB rules on small business loans were calibrated with little, if any, information on small business loans. We argue that the...

We build a stylized dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions to analyze costs and benefits of capital requirements in the short-term and long-term. We show that since increasing capital requirements limits the aggregate loan supply, the equilibrium loan rate spread increases,...

This paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions hit by aggregate shocks. In particular, it shows that competitive financial contracts can result in excessive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post. Even though, from a...