Accomodated here is a measure space of economic agents, each regarded as a profit maximizing producer, each endowed with his technology and resource bundle. Pooling of private endowments generates a cooperative game with side payments.

We introduce in this work an extension of the model of games with probabilistic graphs arising in Calvo et al. (1999, Math. Soc. Sci. 37, 79), which itself generalizes the one developed by Myerson (1977, Math. of Oper. Res. 2, 225) for games with communications restrictions. In the first of...

We present a simple and easily calculated expression for the Shapley value whenever the characteristic function is a "cost" function with the property that the cost of any subset of players is equal to the cost of the "largest" player in that subset. It turns out that a simple rule previously...

A communication situation consists of a coalitional game and a graph, the nodes of the graph corresponding to the players of the game. To calculate the Myerson value for such situations, we obtain results which extend those well known for trees and cycle-complete graphs. On the other hand, in...