Empty creditors — bondholders hedged with Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) — face incentives to holdout from “Distressed Exchanges” (DEs) of debt because the CDS hedge alters their payoffs to favor bankruptcy. We show using detailed data on DEs that firms respond to this holdout problem by...

This paper provides evidence that firm value declines when credit default swaps (CDS) are initiated, and that the effect is greater when CDS trading activity is higher. This decline, which arises from an increase in the cost of capital as opposed to a decrease in free cash flows, traces to a...

Credit default swaps (CDS) introduce frictions in debt renegotiations because they alter the incentives of creditors insured with CDS to favor bankruptcy instead of restructuring debt out-of-court. Such renegotiation frictions can increase bond spreads by increasing distress resolution costs....