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A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem : axiomatic and strategic perspectives
Hu, Cheng-Cheng; Tsay, Min-Hung; Yeh, Chun-hsien - In: Games and economic behavior 109 (2018), pp. 82-98
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012173182
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Cooperative games in graph structure
Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2000
of ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it … lies in the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We … prove that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core.We conclude by some examples showing the usefulness of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303860
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On the nonemptiness of the α-core of discontinuous games : transferable and nontransferable utilities
Uyanık, Metin - In: Journal of economic theory 158 (2015), pp. 213-231
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011548660
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Large distributional games with traits
Khan, Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Yu, Haomiao; Zhang, Yongchao - In: Economics letters 118 (2013) 3, pp. 502-505
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009729521
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Signaling, screening, and core stability
Kamishiro, Yusuke; Vohra, Rajiv; Serrano, Roberto - In: Journal of economic theory 213 (2023), pp. 1-31
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014471942
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On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game
Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016
The alternating offers game due to Rubinstein (1982) had been used by Binmore (1980) and by Binmore et.al. (1986) to provide via its unique subgame perfect equilibrium an approximate non-cooperative support for the Nash bargaining solution of associated cooperative two-person bargaining games....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412680
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The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands
Nieva, Ricardo - 2015
We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159
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An experiment on the Nash program : comparing two strategic mechanisms implementing the shapley value
Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2022
We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-basedWinter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252966
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The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value
Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2022 - Revised August 2022
We experimentally compare a simplified version of two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an (ex ante) equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: one proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and the other by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, PC-W). While H-MC...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252972
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Backward induction foundations of the Shapley value
McQuillin, Ben; Sugden, Robert - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 84 (2016) 6, pp. 2265-2280
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011791227