Have post-crisis reforms purged mortgage markets of adverse selection? I show that loans synthetically sold by Fannie Mae through Credit Risk Transfers are ex post riskier, controlling for observable quality, than those they keep on balance. Transfers that go unreported on public data are...

We consider loans being marked to market to constitute information about borrowing firms' profitability and risk only immediately available to large institutional traders, so-called qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). Smaller investors, so-called non-QIBs, do not have immediate access to such...

We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an information advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure from the transaction lenders prevents the local lender from extracting the full surplus from projects, so that she...

This paper studies the welfare impact of reputation/feedback systems in markets where both adverse selection and moral hazard are present. Using a transaction-level dataset from an online credit market, I estimate a dynamic model of borrowers and lenders, in which borrowers are subject to...

We study the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the market for small business lines of credit. We estimate a structural model of credit demand, loan use, pricing, and firm default using matched firm-bank data from Italy. We find evidence of adverse selection in the...

This analysis introduces a theoretical framework for assessing the empirical discussion of asymmetric information amongst mortgage lenders and adds the idea of lender competition into this framework. Despite this addition, the results are generally consistent with existing empirical findings...

Does the Church Tower Principle, i.e. geographical proximity between borrowing firm and lending bank, matter in credit risk management? If so, the bank might expose itself to a greater risk by lending to distant firms and should therefore respond by rationing them harder. In this paper we...

Governments must usually take policy decisions with an imperfect knowledge of the economic actors' type or the actors' effort level. These issues are addressed within the framework of classic adverse selection or moral hazard models. I discuss in this paper how would the government’s and the...

A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained...