We analyze choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory first price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to gain experience for a fixed period of time prior to making a single payoff-relevant choice. Behavior of more experienced sellers was...

We analyze choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory first price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to gain experience for a fixed period of time prior to making a single payoff-relevant choice. Behavior of more experienced sellers was...

Subjects chose whether to leave with an endowment or stay to perform some simple tasks in a real effort experiment. In addition to performance pay, staying subjects received their endowment in the control condition, but had to sacrifice it in the treatment condition. We found average performance...

We show that allowing communication can increase optimal choices and efficiency in a multi-task, incomplete contracting, principal-agent setting. We study two simple communication protocols, one allowing for one or more requests on non-contractible choices, and the other allowing for a request,...

We study sets of preferences containing some partial order. It appears that all preferences containing a certain partial order form a convex set of preferences with respect to the betweenness relation induced by the Kemeny distance for preferences. Moreover, the other way round these convex sets...

This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a stable matching may fail to exist even when both couples and...

We study a many-to-one matching problem between institutions and individuals where an institution can possibly be matched to more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view pairs of jobs as complements. Institutions' preferences over sets of individuals are assumed...