This paper shows that inter-regulatory competition can have powerful pro-consumer effects in an open economy world even when the consumers have little political influence. These findings overturn the welfare implications of capture theories that show that regulators do not vigorously pursue...

Drawing on the insights of game theory and East Asian experience, this short note argues the importance of co-operative solutions in achieving economic development. To realise these, even genuine developmental states must convince a sceptical private sector of their commitment to economic...

This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is an introduction. section we review the existing research on (sequential) pooled auctions. section 3m formalized our model of simultaneous ooled suctions while in the section 4 we derive the equilibrium bidding strategies. Section 5 contains the...

The valuation of debt and equity, reorganization boundaries and firm's The valuation of debt and equity, reorganization boundaries and firm's optimal dividend policies are studied in a framework where we model strategic interactions between debtholders and equityholders in a game-theoretic...

In Esteban and Ray (1999) we formalize a model in which individuals lobby before the government in order to benefit from some productivity enhancing government action (infrastructure, direct subsidies, permissions, in short). The government honestly tries to allocate these permissions to the...

The Olson Paradox referes to the observation that larger groups may be less successful in furthering their interests. We address the paradox within an explicit game-theoretic model of lobbying.