This paper presents a model of international trade agreements in which the executive branches of each government negotiate agreements while the legislative branches, subject to political pressure from firms, can disrupt them. Lobbying is in the style of Grossman and Helpman (1994) with a new...

There has been considerable dissatisfaction expressed by both free trade proponents and environment activists with respect to the WTO's exercise of authority on the impact of environmental measures on international trade. The Article first sets out a analytical framework, based on public choice...

This paper determines the extent to which the United States and the Soviet Union exhibited Approach-Avoidance behavior in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (both I and II). Progress of the talks and negotiating behavior is measured by a Concession/Retraction scale of the negotiating positions...

This paper presents a model of international trade agreements in which the executive branches of each government negotiate agreements while the legislative branches, subject to political pressure from firms, can disrupt them. Lobbying is in the style of Grossman and Helpman's ‘Protection for...

The distributional consequences of intra-industry trade are well documented in the literature, yet exporting firms shape trade policy in their favor. How? I argue that exporters expect higher returns from lobbying when they face more intense import competition. I introduce a model of...

Overpromising remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties’ performance. This paper provides a theory-based explanation and evaluation of this regime and its consequences, with an empirical application to the Kyoto...

When making collective decisions, principals (voters or districts) typically benefit by strategically delegating their bargaining and voting power to representatives different from themselves. There are conflicting views in the literature, however, of whether such a delegate should be...

We examine how donor government ideology influences the composition of foreign aid flows. We use data for 23 OECD countries over the period 1960–2009 and distinguish between multilateral and bilateral aid, grants and loans, recipient characteristics such as income and political institutions,...

We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial...