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Governance literature finds that the independent directors from the lending banks (CBDs) bring both financial expertise and conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholder. We examine how the presence of CBDs affects the implicit incentive of CEO turnover. Using BoardEx and DealScan...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859136
One of the primary roles of corporate boards is to control the processes by which top executives are assessed and if necessary replaced. CEO turnover cannot be viewed in isolation because it affects the behavior of the involved players and hence interacts with other organizational goals. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052832
I examine how cross-sectional differences in national culture dimensions affect the probability of CEO turnover and its sensitivity to firm performance after cross-listing by a non-U.S. firm in the United States. I find that three of the Hofstede indexes (long-term orientation, power distance,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932853
This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. Directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience large and persistent increases in withheld votes at subsequent re-elections relative to non-turnover-interlocked directors. Reputational losses are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012514153
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This study investigates market reactions to announcements of CEO turnover and finds that forced turnovers are not accompanied by positive returns, which contradicts the broad view that firing a CEO sends a positive signal to the market. This contradiction is further explored by focusing on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587940
This study investigates a communication game between a CEO and a board of directors where the CEO's career concerns can potentially impede value-increasing informative communication. By adopting a policy of aggressive boards (excessive replacement), shareholders can facilitate communication...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242134
We examine the CEO turnover in LBOs backed by private equity funds. When a company is taken private, we find that the CEO turnover decreases and is less contingent on performance. We also find that a higher involvement of the LBO sponsors, who replace the outside directors on the board after...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013035557
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