In this paper we investigate the issues of identification and capital regulation of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Both issues are fundamental for global financial stability. However, there are many open questions that remain on the political and academic agenda. We underline that...

This in-depth analysis provides evidence on differences in the practice of supervising large banks in the UK and in the euro area. It identifies the diverging institutional architecture (partially supranationalised vs. national oversight) as a pivotal determinant for a higher effectiveness of...

Based on publicly available data we propose a simple taxonomy of the banks under the direct supervision of the ECB, taking into account their core business, size, and degree of internationalization. We compare the structures of the balance sheet and income statement of the eight different types...

We set out a stylised framework for the policies enacted to address the risks from systemically important institutions and to counter the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem, examining conceptually how far supervisory and resolution policies are complementary or substitutable. The Financial Stability...

The potential failure of a large bank presents vexing questions for policymakers. It poses significant risks to other financial institutions, to the financial system as a whole, and possibly to the economic and social order. Because of such fears, policymakers in many countries—developed and...

This paper provides evidence on how the new international regulation on Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) impacts the market value of large banks. We analyze the stock price reactions for the 300 largest banks from 52 countries across 12 relevant regulatory announcement and...