This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-player games. We show that continuous …/T , regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-player zero-sum games do not possess the fictitious …-play property. As an extension, we consider networks in which each bilateral game is strategically zero-sum, a weighted potential …

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous … convergence is 1/T, regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-person zero-sum games with bilinear payoff … functions do not possess the continuous-time fictitious-play property. As extensions, we consider networks in which each …

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-player games. We show that continuous …/T , regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-player zero-sum games do not possess the fictitious …-play property. As an extension, we consider networks in which each bilateral game is strategically zero-sum, a weighted potential …

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous … convergence is 1/T, regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-person zero-sum games with bilinear payoff … functions do not possess the continuous-time fictitious-play property. As extensions, we consider networks in which each …

The novelty of our model is to combine models of collective action on networks with models of social learning. Agents … are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to … network. (2) Average inclination governs collective adoption behavior. (3) Initial inclinations determine the critical mass of …

equilibrium networks are nested split graphs. Additionally, we show that the game is a potential game, even when we introduce …