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Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2015

We consider a bandit problem faced by a team of two heterogeneous players. The team is hierarchical in that one (the principal) retains the exclusive right to terminate the project while the other (the agent) focuses strictly on implementing the project assigned to him. As a key departure, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343543

A war of attrition with experimenting players

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

A standard incomplete-information war of attrition is extended to incorporate experimentation and private learning. We …-run and long-run gains of experimentation. The extension yields qualitative impacts on the strategic nature of the problem …. The option value of experimentation serves as a credible commitment device to stay in the game, which is instrumental in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011756011

Hierarchical thinking and learning in rank order contests

Cãrare, Octavian; Haruvy, Ernan; Prasad, Ashutosh - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 10 (2007) 3, pp. 305-316

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003608194

Hierarchical Experimentation

Chen, Chia-Hui - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013014110

Hierarchical Thinking and Learning in Rank Order Contests

Carare, Octavian; Haruvy, Ernan; Prasad, Ashutosh - 2012

We analyze a class of coordination games in which the Kth player to submit an entry wins a contest. These games have an infinite number of symmetric equilibria and the set of equilibria does not change with K. We run experiments with 15 participants and with K=3, 7, and 11. Our experiments show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014173267