We consider an exchange who wishes to set suitable make-take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach, we are able to describe in quasi-explicit form the optimal contract to propose to a market maker. This contract depends essentially on the market maker...

We consider an auction market in which market makers fill the order book during a given time period while some other investors send market orders. We define the clearing price of the auction as the price maximizing the exchanged volume at the clearing time according to the supply and demand of...

We introduce a new matching design for financial transactions in an electronic market. In this mechanism, called ad hoc electronic auction design (AHEAD), market participants can trade between themselves at a fixed price and trigger an auction when they are no longer satisfied with this...

In this paper, we investigate the impact of the accident reporting strategy of drivers, within a Bonus-Malus system. We exhibit the induced modification of the corresponding class level transition matrix and derive the optimal reporting strategy for rational drivers. The hunger for bonuses...