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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968157
This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake a costly action or investment that together produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. Two cases are considered: (i) where agents are risk...
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Although popular in some circles, efficiency wage models of the labour market have proved surprisingly difficult to test and direct evidence for the central tenets of the theory is rare to non-existent. In this paper we propose a simple test of the Shapiro-Stiglitz shirking model which is based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746063
This paper develops theories of multi-sector search by unemployed workers. The paper then attempts to distinguish empirically whether unemployed workers target their job search efforts exclusively on a particular sector at any point in time, or whether they search in a 'non-targeted' fashion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005688185
We present an overview of models of long-term self-enforcing labor contracts in which risk sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed which is sufficiently general to encompass the two-agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766123
This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who undertake costly actions or investments which produce a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636088
The authors examine long-term wage contracts between a risk-neutral firm and a risk-averse worker when both can costlessly renege and bu y or sell labor at a random spot market wage. A self-enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege. In th e optimum...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005312785