This study develops an economic model for a social planner who prioritizes health over short- term wealth accumulation during a pandemic. Agents are connected through a weighted undirected network of contacts, and the planner's objective is to determine the policy that contains the spread of...

We develop a theory that addresses the existence of stable vaccine allocations in a political economy where vaccination offers both private and social benefits. These are allocation policies that a political leader can enforce without losing their popularity. We show that a stable allocation may...

In majoritarian democracies, popular policies may not be inclusive, and inclusive policies may not be popular. This dilemma raises the crucial question of when it is possible to design a policy that is both inclusive and popular. We address this question in the context of vaccine allocation in a...

We develop a theory that addresses the problem of the existence of stable vaccine allocations in a political economy. These are allocation policies that a political leader can enforce without losing their popularity. Our analysis distinguishes between contexts where vaccination has positive...

How does fairness affect individual incentives and efficiency in a free economy? We show that elementary distributive justice principles guarantee a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a finite economy where agents non-cooperatively choose their inputs and derive utility from their pay. Chief...