How do pandemics affect for-profit and not-for-profit organizations differently? To address this question, we analyze optimal lockdowns in a two-sector continuous-time individual-based mean-field epidemiological model. We uncover a unique solution that depends on network structure, lockdown...

We develop a theory that addresses the existence of stable vaccine allocations in a political economy where vaccination offers both private and social benefits. These are allocation policies that a political leader can enforce without losing their popularity. We show that a stable allocation may...

How does fairness affect individual incentives and efficiency in a free economy? We show that elementary distributive justice principles guarantee a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a finite economy where agents non-cooperatively choose their inputs and derive utility from their pay. Chief...

In majoritarian democracies, popular policies may not be inclusive, and inclusive policies may not be popular. This dilemma raises the crucial question of when it is possible to design a policy that is both inclusive and popular. We address this question in the context of vaccine allocation in a...

We study procedures that embed clauses granting agents the right to oppose actions that are not in their interest, retract actions that face opposition, and punish harmful actions. Our analyses show that coalitional strategic behaviors under these procedures lead to reciprocal actions. We then...

Do the effects of government policy response to health crises differ for for-profit and not-for-profit organizations? We address this question through the lens of a two-sector continuous-time individual-based mean-field theoretical model that incorporates a non-random social network. Using...