We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous … agents with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in a lottery (Tullock) contest, and then are assortatively …

Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in two-sided matching problems by selecting lotteries over matchings … set of utility functions with increasing differences, stability and non-manipulability characterize Compromises and … corresponding notions of ex-ante stability and non-manipulability. For most sets, the properties are incompatible. However, for the …

notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one …-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new … ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency. …

This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …-specific information, we propose a stability notion which, in addition to requiring individual rationality and no blocking pairs, captures …