A partnership game is a two person game in which both players necessarily receive the same payoff. For symmetric partnership games it is shown that asymptotic stability with respect to the replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith and Price [1973], Thomas [1985]) and equilibrium...

Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play...

We show how to derive nonparametric estimates from results for Bernoulli distributions, provided the means are the only parameters of interest. The only information is that the support of each random variable is contained in a known bounded set. Examples include presenting minimax risk...

We show how to a derive exact distribution-free nonparametric results for minimax risk when underlying random variables have known finite bounds and means are the only parameters of interest. Transform the data with a randomized mean preserving transformation into binary data and then apply the...

We select among rules for learning which of two actions in a stationary decision problem achieves a higher expected payo¤when payoffs realized by both actions are known in previous instances. Only a bounded set containing all possible payoffs is known. Rules are evaluated using maximum risk...

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the...

Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic $2\times 2$ game such as Matching Pennies. Between matching rounds, individuals sometimes change their strategy after observing a finite sample of other outcomes within their population. Individuals...

We analyze the evolution of behavioral rules for learning how to play a two-armed bandit. Individuals have no information about the underlying pay-off distributions and have limited memory about their own past experience. Instead they must rely on information obtained through observing the...

The object of the paper will be to investigate the effect of pre- play communication on the evolution of strategies for playing a given game. Communication is modelled as cheap talk: before the game is played, the players simultaneously exchange messages from some finite set of messages. There...