We study the incentives of a digital business to collect and protect users' information. The information the business collects improves the service it provides to consumers, but it may also be accessed, at a cost, by strategic third parties in a way that harms users, imposing privacy costs. We...

What makes you popular at school? And what are the labor market returns to popularity? We investigate these questions using an objective measure of popularity derived from sociometric theory: the number of friendship nominations received from schoolmates, interpreted as a measure of early...

We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the platform fully internalizes the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all...

We study a setting in which a platform mediates the interactions between firms and consumers. The platform has detailed information on consumers’ preferences and jointly controls the (possibly many-to-many) matching between firms and consumers and the information firms receive about consumer...

I study a one-way flow connections model in which players are heterogeneous with respect to values and the costs of establishing a link. I first show that values and costs asymmetries are crucial in determining the level of connectedness of a network. Interestingly, unconnected equilibria are...