Dworczak et al. (2021) study when certain market structures are optimal in the presence of heterogeneous preferences. A key assumption is that the social planner knows the joint distribution of the value of the good and marginal value of money. This paper studies whether relevant features of...

We investigate a model of deterministic stochastic choice for the standard con- sumer problem. We introduce the framework of statistical consumer theory where the individual maximizes their utility with respect to a distribution of bundles that is constrained by a statistic (e.g. mean...

Applied research often tolerates misspecification in order to reach informative conclusions. We focus on how the degree of misspecification varies with the level of aggregation of data for quasilinear utility models. We present aggregation results formalizing that the model cannot get worse when...

We present a tractable generalization of quantal response equilibrium via non-expected utility preferences. In particular, we introduce concave perturbed utility games in which an individual has strategy-specific utility indices that depend on the outcome of the game and an additively separable...

We investigate deterministic stochastic choice in the standard consumer framework. We present a model of statistical consumer theory where the individual maximizes their utility with respect to a distribution of bundles that is constrained by a statistic of the distribution (e.g. mean...

This paper presents a cardinal measure of choice consistency for perturbed utility models. The measure of choice consistency is built on additive errors to the model. The additive errors are meaningful since the perturbed utility model is cardinal and utility differences are meaningful. We...

Dworczak, Kominers, and Akbarpour (2021) study when certain market structures are optimal in the presence of heterogeneous preferences. A key assumption to apply the results is that the social planner knows the joint distribution of the value of the good and marginal value of money. We show that...