This note argues that a rigorous application of simple game theory may provide unambiguous yet non-trivial theoretical insights about the behaviour of players in simple games. This contrasts with a commonly held view that many predictions in applied game theory are either obvious or...

In this note we characterize the strategic implication of intrinsic correlation, introduced by Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008), in the subjective correlated equilibrium setting of a complete information game. Intrinsic correlation restricts correlation devices to variables within the game,...

Given a game and a dynamics on the space of strategies it is possible to associate to any component of Nash equilibria, an integer, this is the index, see Ritzberger (1994). This number gives useful information on the equilibrium set and in particular on its stability properties under the given...

The Nash equilibrium concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependant utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) area better predictor...

In an example with two objects and four bidders, some of which have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential , the one-shot simultaneous, and the...

Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol as a protocol from which no individual may...