In this paper it is shown that the core and the bargaining sets of Davis-Maschler and Zhou coincide in a class of …

-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise … parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core …

general conditions. They imply that any efficient profile that is approximately achievable must be in the core of the …) an efficient profile can be approximately achieved if and only if it is in the core; and (iii) any achievable profile can …

-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …

In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in …-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case … of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those …