Korpela [A Simple Sufficient Condition for Strong Implementation, J. Econ. Theory (2013), in press] derives a simple sufficient condition for strong implementation. Unfortunately, there are two errors in this paper: (1) the main theorem does not hold in the form it was presented and (2) it is...

In this paper, we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the core. The planner's exercise...

Often preferences are such that any sensible goal must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design stipulates that in this case all alternatives must be equilibrium outcomes of the decision making mechanism. However, as far as the idea of an equilibrium is...

We study the relationship between two-agent implementation problems and the notionof interim efficiency due to Holmström and Myerson (1983) in Bayesian environmentswith private values and independent types. We present a general property, Bayesianefficiency, and show that it is sufficient for...

We give a direct and very short proof of the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [Alan Gibbard (1977) and Mark Satterthwaite (1975)]. The proof is based on investigating the properties of one critical preference profile constructed from those alternatives that individuals are not decisive on....