Under capital tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009, American Economic Review, 99(4), 1206-1217) find that uncoordinated policymaking leads to a first-best outcome even in the presence of transboundary pollution.However, I show that if the level of environmental regulation is...

In this paper, we explore automobile fuel efficiency policies in the presence of two externalities i) a global environmental problem; and ii) international innovation spillovers. Using a simple model with two regions, we show that both a fuel tax and a tax on vehicles based on their fuel economy...

This study develops a two-country model, Home and Foreign, with offshoring and environmental spillover. A final good producer in Home can produce (homogeneous) final goods using customized inputs produced by its partner-supplier in Foreign. The intermediate input price is determined by Nash...

In the context of transboundary air pollution policy the broad ambition is to achieve reductions in the level of environmental and societal damage associated with certain pollutant concentrations and exposure rates in a cost effective manner. Policy formulation and legislative frameworks in this...

We construct a two-country model where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Pollution abatement is undertaken sequentially by private producers and the public sector. We characterize the Nash optimal levels of the policy instruments in the two countries: emission taxes and...

A standard result in the literature on environmental economics is that efficient environmental policies regulating transboundary pollution will be adopted only if there is interjurisdictional coordination. Efficient policies can be adopted as a result of interregional treaties or mandated by a...