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A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety lurk two fundamental alternatives. The aggrieved party may (i) 'affirm' the contract and seek money damages or specific performance; or...
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This chapter surveys major issues arising in the economic analysis of contract law. It begins with an introductory discussion of scope and methodology, and then addresses four main topics that correspond to the major doctrinal divisions of the law of contracts. These divisions include freedom of...
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We analyze noncontractible investments in a model with shading. A seller can make an investment that affects a buyer …’s value. The parties have outside options that depend on asset ownership. When shading is not possible and there is no …, with shading, such a contract creates deadweight losses. We show that an optimal contract will limit the seller’s offers …
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A loss-averse buyer and seller face an uncertain environment. Should they write a long-term contract or wait until the state of the world is realized? I show that simple long-term contracts perform better than insinuated in Herweg and Schmidt (2015), even though loss aversion makes renegotiation...
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We propose a theory of inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegoti- ated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and losses...
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We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and...
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