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elektronische Koordination und in verstärkte Produktdifferenzierung in einem Duopol mit räumlich getrennten Märkten. Wir zeigen … duopoly where firms compete in two spatially separated markets. We show that firms always have nonnegative incentives to … Produktdifferenzierung eigentlich erhöhen. Wir analysieren die Interaktion der Investitionsentscheidungen in transportkostensenkende …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010509336
In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the …
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elektronische Koordination und in verstärkte Produktdifferenzierung in einem Duopol mit räumlich getrennten Märkten. Wir zeigen … duopoly where firms compete in two spatially separated markets. We show that firms always have nonnegative incentives to … Produktdifferenzierung eigentlich erhöhen. Wir analysieren die Interaktion der Investitionsentscheidungen in transportkostensenkende …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001736217
We present a model of vertical product differentiation and exit where a domestic and a foreign firm face fixed setup costs and quality-dependent costs of production and compete in quality and price in the domestic market. Quality-dependent costs are quadratic in qualities, but independent of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155656
In this paper we show that a homogeneous-product market with multiple Bertrand equilibria becomes a market with a … single Bertrand equilibrium when we introduce a small degree of product differentiation. When differentiation tends to zero …, that Bertrand equilibrium converges to the unique competitive equilibrium of the homogeneous-product market, which is in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158272
This paper introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in vertically differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous different qualities. I then extend the analysis to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954129