This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat, who is averse to letting the public down. We...

This paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture. A model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters. In equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and...

Households in the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) and Central Asia (CA) regions have adopted coping strategies to withstand negative income shocks during the transition. The most common strategies include family and community support, emigration, and a wide range of activities in the...

Dans les pays membres de la Coopération économique de la mer Noire comme en Asie centrale, les ménages ont adopté des stratégies pour contrecarrer les effets négatifs de la transition sur leurs revenus. Ils s’appuient notamment sur l’entraide familiale et communautaire, sur...

Mutual aid among villagers in developing countries often is the sole possibility to insure against economic shocks. By using field laboratory experiments in Cambodian villages we study social cohesion in newly resettled and established communities which are both part of a land distribution...

Mutual aid among villagers in developing countries is often the only means of insuring against economic shocks. We use 'lab-in-the-field experiments' in Cambodian villages to study solidarity in established and newly resettled communities. Both communities are part of a land distribution project...