We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of ex ante vote-trading equilibrium, and show by construction that an equilibrium exists. The equilibriumwe...

This paper proposes an approach to proving nonparametric identification for distributions of bidders' values in asymmetric second-price auctions. I consider the case when bidders have independent private values and the only available data pertain to the winner's identity and the transaction...

Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is close to optimal. We show that this claim is too strong. The auction...

Auction fever is a multifaceted phenomenon thatis frequently observed in both traditional and Internetauctions. In order to gain a better understanding of itscauses, we develop a conceptual framework to analyzeemotions in auctions, which is based on an exhaustiveliterature review. The framework...

Recent research strengthens the conjecture that human decision-making stems from a complexinteraction of rational judgment and emotional processes. A prominent example of the impact ofemotions in economic decision-making is the effect of regret-related information feedback on biddingbehaviour in...

Auctions are nowadays a popular and frequently employed market mechanism in electronicmarkets. In economic literature, the success of electronic auctions has been largelyattributed to the reduction of transaction costs, the large number of potential buyers,and the independence of time and space....

Die Arbeit präsentiert ein lineares Optimierungsverfahren, das Teilnehmern einer Workshopveranstaltung Plätze in Workshops zuteilt, basierend auf persönlichen Präferenzen.Diverse Nebenbedingungen werden dabei beachtet. In einer zweiten Stufe wird das Ergebnis weiter verbessert, indem private...

The paper analyses the timing of spontaneous environmental innovation when second-mover advantages, arising from the expectation of declining investment costs, increase the option value of waiting created by investment irreversibility and uncertainty about private payoffs. We then focus on the...

We study the competition to operate an infrastructure service by developing a model where firms report a two-dimensional sealed bid: the price to consumers and the concession fee paid to the government. Two alternative bidding rules are considered in this paper. One rule consists of awarding the...

The paper characterizes the mixed-strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes that depend positively on own effort and negatively on the effort of competitors. Such auctions arise naturally in the context of investment games, lobbying games, and promotion tournaments. We also...