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Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice
Feess, Eberhard; Grund, Christian; Walzl, Markus; … - 2015 - This version: December 19, 2014
We analyze mechanism choices of competing sellers with private valuations and show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers with higher reservation value choose mechanisms with a lower selling probability and a larger revenue in case of trade. As an application we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010470913
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Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice
Feess, Eberhard; Grund, Christian; Walzl, Markus; … - 2014 - This version: November 3, 2014
We analyze mechanism choices of competing sellers with private valuations and show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers with higher reservation value choose mechanisms with a lower selling probability and a larger revenue in case of trade. As an application we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428738
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Liability and information transmission : the advantage of negligence based rules
Feess, Eberhard; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - In: Economics letters 92 (2006) 1, pp. 63-67
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003336509
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Environmental liability under uncertain causation
Feess, Eberhard; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - In: European journal of law and economics 28 (2009) 2, pp. 133-148
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003879023
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Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence
Feess, Eberhard; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - In: Economics letters 104 (2009) 2, pp. 69-71
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003870163
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Screening in courts : on the joint use of negligence and causation standards
Feess, Eberhard; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 27 (2011) 2, pp. 350-375
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009261834
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Reporter's privilege and incentives to leak
Baum, Ido; Feess, Eberhard; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 5 (2009) 1, pp. 701-715
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009488753
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The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence : evidence from the laboratory
Feess, Eberhard; Schramm, Markus; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - In: Economic experiments on delegation and deterrence, (pp. 100-126). 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011375884
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The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence : theory and evidence from the laboratory
Feess, Eberhard; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Schramm, … - 2015
We develop a theoretical model to identify and compare partial and equilibrium effects of uncertainty and the magnitude of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when the other side's behavior is exogenously given....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345790
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The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence : theory and evidence from the laboratory
Feess, Eberhard; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Schramm, … - 2015
We develop a theoretical model to identify and compare partial and equilibrium effects of uncertainty and the magnitude of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when the other side's behavior is exogenously given....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011347317