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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification

Li, Yunan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1139-1194

A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget‐constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare‐maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two‐stage scheme. First, agents report...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806402

Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments

Li, Yunan - In: Journal of economic theory 186 (2020), pp. 1-54

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Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values

Li, Yunan - In: Games and economic behavior 103 (2017), pp. 225-253

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Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition

Li, Yunan - 2016

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Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments

Li, Yunan - 2016 - Latest version

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Endogenous labor market cycles

Li, Yunan; Wang, Cheng - In: International economic review 63 (2022) 2, pp. 849-881

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Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification

Li, Yunan - 2017

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Collective decision through an informed mediator

Li, Yunan; Zhang, Xingtan - In: Journal of economic theory : JET 218 (2024), pp. 1-17

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ENDOGENOUS LABOR MARKET CYCLES

Li, Yunan; Wang, Cheng - In: International Economic Review 63 (2021) 2, pp. 849-881

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012809708

Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification

Li, Yunan - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1139-1194

A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget-constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare-maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two-stage scheme. First, agents report their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189054