We model the dynamic contest between two players as a game of tug-of-war with a Tullock contest success function (CSF). We show that (pure strategy) Markov perfect equilibrium of this game exists, and it is unique. In this equilibrium - in stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all pay...

We model the dynamic contest between two players as a game of tug-of-war with a Tullock contest success function (CSF). We show that (pure strategy) Markov perfect equilibrium of this game exists, and it is unique. In this equilibrium - in stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all pay...

We model the dynamic contest between two players as a game of tug-of-war with a Tullock contest success function (CSF). We show that (pure strategy) Markov perfect equilibrium of this game exists, and it is unique. In this equilibrium - in stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all pay...