Randomised controlled or clinical trials (RCTs) are generally viewed as the most reliable method to draw causal inference as to the effects of a treatment, as they should guarantee that the individuals being compared differ only in terms of their exposure to the treatment of interest. This...

The numerous reports on preference reversals in preference elicitations pose a great challenge to empirical economics. Many studies have found that different procedures may generate substantially different preferences. However, little is known about whether one procedure is more susceptible to...

For decisions in the wild, time is of the essence. Available decision time is often cut short through natural or artificial constraints, or is impinged upon by the opportunity cost of time. Experimental economists have only recently begun to conduct experiments with time constraints and to...

Since the advent of the discounted utility (DU) model economists have thought about intertemporal choice in very specific terms. DU assumes that people make explicit tradeoffs between costs and benefits occurring at different points in time. While this explicit tradeoff perspective is simple and...

Contemporary works, such as Lusk & Hudson's (2004), find that the greater knowledge regarding the possible results of the ultimatum game lead to results closer to the subgame perfect equilibrium. In this paper we seek to further this line of research beyond the fact of making the individuals...

Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation – the selection of an interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found...

We measured the beliefs and behavior of third parties who were given the opportunity to add to or deduct from the payoffs of individuals who engaged in an economic bargaining game under different social contexts. Third parties rewarded bargaining outcomes that were equal and compensated victims...

Social norms in ultimatum's game establish that extremely unequal offers lead to an inevitable failure. However, even under the obedience of the norm and far from Nash Equilibrium, negotiated wealth is traditionally favorable for proposers when information given is temporally incomplete. In our...

This paper investigates whether language priming activates different cultural identities and norms associated with the language communicated with respect to social preference and risk attitudes. Our contribution is on identifying the conditions where there will be language priming effects. We...