We examine how the voluntary participation decision in international environmental negotiations affects negotiation outcomes when every country is a federation. Each country consists of two autonomous regions: one is a polluter region and the other is a nonpolluter region. In the model, each...

This paper proves that Clarke's mechanism to reveal consumer's demand is nothing but a tautology. He added up the parts to form the sum, and used the sum to find the parts. The so-called Clarke tax is nothing but smoke to distract our attention

Musgrave has tried to develop a system of demand curves to solve the equilibrium quantity of public good. This paper proves that his quantity appears both as exogenous and endogenous variables. The simultaneous solution for the quantity results in a demand curve underneath the horizontal axis....

We perform a laboratory test of Pledge-and-Review bargaining, implementing a simplified version of the model analysed in Harstad (2019). In theory, this institution should increase contributions to a public good only if there is uncertainty over the value of possible future payoffs. In contrast,...

We introduce a perfect price discriminating mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A perfect price discriminating mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price schedule that does not depend on her report. In any...

Do mandatory spending programs such as Medicare improve efficiency? We analyze a model with two parties allocating a fixed budget to a public good and private transfers each period over an infinite horizon. We compare two institutions that differ in whether public good spending is discretionary...

This paper reviews the literature on policies aiming to improve the rule of law and the operation of a legal system. It takes a bottom up perspective of clients seeking access to justice and uses transaction costs on the market for justice as a criterion to evaluate justice policies. Most...

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish...