The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...

The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...

The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...

This paper examines the provision of managerial investment incentives by an accounting based incentive scheme in a multiperiod agency setting in which an impatient manager has to choose between mutually exclusive investment projects. We study the properties of accounting rules that motivate an...

Capital rationing is an empirically well-documented phenomenon. This constraint requiresmanagers to make investment decisions between mutually exclusive investmentopportunities. In a multiperiod agency setting, this paper analyses accounting rules thatprovide managerial incentives for efficient...

This paper examines the provision of managerial investment incentives by an accounting based incentive scheme in a multiperiod agency setting in which an impatient manager has to choose between mutually exclusive investment projects. We study the properties of accounting rules that motivate an...

Capital rationing is an empirically well-documented phenomenon. This constraint requires managers to make investment decisions between mutually exclusive investment opportunities. In a multiperiod agency setting, this paper analyses accounting rules that provide managerial incentives for...

We ask whether the quality of internal information matters for investment decisions. We predict that investment is more sensitive to internal profit signals and less sensitive to external price signals when managers have higher quality internal information. Consistent with recent theoretical and...

We consider a setting where a firm delegates an investment decision and, subsequently, a sales decision to a privately informed manager. For both decisions corporate income taxes have real effects. We show that compensating the manager based on pre-tax residual income can ensure after-tax...

Although an organization's environmental uncertainty may induce greater variability in reported earnings, managers have incentives to reduce this variability. The flexibility accorded by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) provides managers the means to accomplish this via exercising...