Professor John P. Anderson's article, What's the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?, argues that my “Law of Conservation of Securities” has no moral relevance to the question whether to allow such trading.The Law of Conservation of Securities demonstrates that each stock market insider...

The rise of Fintech in the past decade has received growing scholarly attention. This paper surveys Fintech-related articles published in leading finance, accounting, and management journals from 2010 to 2019. It aims to generate a taxonomy of Fintech and accumulate knowledge in the fields of...

We develop a model in which feedback effects from equity markets to firms' access to external finance allow uninformed traders to profit by short selling a firm's stock while going long on its competitors. Because this strategy distorts the investment incentives of the firm targeted by short...

We examine the impact of a regulation that requires only disclosure of ownership information and no real change of firm fundamentals, on a firm's access to capital. As a first of its kind corporate governance regulation across the globe, Clause 35 of the Securities Exchange Board of India...

We examine the interaction between corporate governance at two levels: internal organizational governance that is intended to distinguish among managers of a priori unknown abilities to determine who becomes CEO, and corporate governance at the board level that seeks to retain or fire the CEO...

In this paper I examine how the protection of creditors' rights influence the way in which foreign bank entry affects the access to credit of firms. Using a sample of more than 6000 firms in 22 transition countries I find that as bankruptcy proceedings become more inefficient foreign bank entry...

We use a sample of U.S. dual-class companies to examine how the divergence between insider control rights and cash-flow rights affects managerial extraction of private benefits of control. We find that as the insider control-cash flow rights divergence becomes larger, dual-class acquirers...

In spite of the importance of optimal contracting problems under moral hazard and adverse selection, current literature offers no optimal solutions to contracting problems under moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents. The agent's risk aversion, however, appears to be critical...

Recent corporate governance reforms focus on board independence and encourage equity ownership by directors. We analyze the efficacy of these reforms in a model where both adverse selection and moral hazard are present at the level of the firm's management. Delegating governance to the board...

We explore why venture capital funds limit the amount of capital they raise and do not reinvest the proceeds. This structure is puzzling because it leads to a succession of several funds financing each new venture which multiplies the well known agency problems. We argue that an inside investor...