Banks' holding of reasonable capital buffers in excess of minimum requirements could alleviate the procyclicality problem potentially exacerbated by the rating-sensitive capital charges of Basel II. Determining the sufficient buffer size is an important risk management task for banks, which the...

We derive a principal-agent model to analyze the effectiveness of bonus caps and deferrals in regulating banks' risk-taking. We calibrate the model to a sample of large US banks on the eve of the Global Financial Crisis and run counterfactual analyses of the potential effects of the...

We derive a principal-agent model to analyze the effectiveness of bonus caps and deferrals in regulating banks' risk-taking. We calibrate the model to a sample of large US banks on the eve of the Global Financial Crisis and run counterfactual analyses of the potential effects of the regulations....

We investigate how European banks' overnight borrowing costs depend on bank size. We use the Eurosystem's proprietary interbank daily loan data on euro-denominated transactions from 2008-2014. We find that large banks have had a clear borrowing cost advantage over small banks and that this...

Basel III has introduced a non-risk-weighted leverage ratio requirement (LRR) which complements the internal ratings based (IRB) capital requirements. It provides a backstop against model risk which arises if some loans get incorrectly rated and become toxic. We study the effects of the LRR on...

We investigate the relationship between the daily average interbank overnight borrowing rate (AOR) and the credit default swap price (CDS) of 60 banks using the Eurosystem's proprietary data from mid-2008 to mid-2013. We find that the AOR which is observable only by the competent Eurosystem...

We construct a measure of a bank's relative creditworthiness from Eurosystem's proprietary overnight loan data: the bank's “average overnight borrowing rate spread, relative to overnight rate index” (AOR). We investigate the dynamic relationship between the AOR and the credit default swap...

​Concern that government may not guarantee bank deposits in a future crisis can cause a bank run. The government may break its guarantee during a severe crisis because of time-inconsistent preferences regarding the use of public resources. However, as deposits are withdrawn during the bank...

This paper contains a testing framework for the reliability of systemic risk measurement of banks, using the three leading market-based measures of systemic risk. We test whether the difference within the same category and across dfferent categories of systemic risk of individual banks is...

The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation for relative pricing of futures contracts with respect to underlying stocks using a model incorporating short sales constraints and informational lags between the two markets.In this model stocks and futures are perfect substitutes, except...