In this document, we demonstrate that the risk-taking contest game studied in "Skewing the odds: Taking risks for rank-based rewards" has no asymmetric equilibria and, hence, the symmetric equilibrium identified there is, in fact, the unique equilibrium.The paper, "Skewing the odds: Taking risks...

In competitions for rank-based rewards, how does the structure of rewards affect risk-taking? We answer this question in a framework where, subject only to a mean-performance constraint, contestants compete for rank-based "prizes" by choosing random performance levels. We derive the unique...

This paper considers lending to finance projects in a setting where repayment enforcement appears impossible. The loan was illegal and thus legally unenforceable. Creditors were incapable of applying private coercion to force repayment. Borrowers lacked both collateral and reputation capital....

We model the repair of damaged corporate reputations through organizational structure reform. In a rational-choice framework our model explains the effects of the emergence and growth of the professional reputation-crisis management industry. The model produces two key conclusions: (a) Although,...

This appendix comprises four parts. The first part presents proofs of lemmas and propositions. The second part presents some additional robustness tests. The third part reports the results of analyses designed to reconcile our results with a prior empirical study on a closely related issue. The...