This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …

collusion and capture between middle managers and line workers; provided that this detrimental form of collusion takes place in … of a collusive agreement a party has to incur to walk away from such a side deal. Delegation is then a simple way for the … principal to compensate the uninformed colluding party for walking out of collusion and for using/reporting the information …

, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because … nonmonetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion …

ability to monitor quality. Although the possibility of collusion against the principal is eliminated under decentralized …

ability to monitor quality. Although the possibility of collusion against the principal is eliminated under decentralized …

ability to monitor quality. Although the possibility of collusion against the principal is eliminated under decentralized …

We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost … suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the … collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest …

This paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier principal–intermediary–agent hierarchy. In … this hierarchy, monetary transfer is not feasible, delegation is made sequentially, and all players are strategic. We … characterize the optimal delegation mechanism. It is shown that the single-interval delegation a la Holmstrom is optimal only when …