who has an interest in the outcome of the game. I analyze whether the game with delegation to a common agent improves over … complete set of equilibrium outcomes for the game with delegation, including the asymmetric outcomes. I also provide an answer …

Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic … effect which reduces an inefficient agent’s take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control …, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with …

the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal. …

exogenous risk and delegation. That is, we show that only if exogenous risk is sufficiently large, the risk-neutral principal …

-employee relationship. We study a model of delegation with an informed agent, where the principal may impose money-burning on the agent as a … some results novel to the delegation literature. First, money-burning is more likely if the principal is more sensitive to …

Supplementary Appendix to "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives."The paper "Delegation and Nonmonetary Incentives" to …

implementation leads to more delegation, but only if workers have high costs of obstructing informed decisions. We further find that …

The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project … selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the … without task commitment and other behavioral effects the principal might forgo delegation though being efficient. …

Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic … effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control …, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with …