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Separation of ownership and control : delegation as a commitment device

Boukouras, Aristotelis - 2011

This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the separation of ownership and control in firms. An entrepreneur hires a worker, whose effort is necessary for running a project. The worker's effort determines the probability that the project will be completed on time, but the worker...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010348626

Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority

Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - 2010 - First Version: January 2002; Revised, February 2010

We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensationbased and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822070

Decision initiation, decision implementation, and the allocation of decision rights

Sloof, Randolph; Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2015

implementation leads to more delegation, but only if workers have high costs of obstructing informed decisions. We further find that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342342

Vertical relationships with hidden interactions

Kim, Jaesoo; Shin, Dongsoo - In: Games 14 (2023) 6, pp. 1-21

environments while removing sabotaging incentives at no cost once collusion is deterred. As a result, the cooperative structure can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443301

What’s the Damage? Environmental Regulation with Policy-Motivated Bureaucrats

Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014

environmental impact, the bureau is permitted to set its own preferred policy (optimal delegation). …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010813781

Politics and Monetary Policy

Ehrmann, Michael; Fratzscher, Marcel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

How and why do politicians’ preferences about monetary policy differ from the interest rates set by independent central banks? Looking at the European Central Bank, the paper shows that politicians, on average, favor significantly lower interest rates. Three factors explain the different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784739

Delegation and Rewards

Vetter, Stefan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556731

What's the damage? Environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats

Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - Centrum für angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2014

environmental impact, the bureau is permitted to set its own preferred policy (optimal delegation). …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010984546

Trade, Self-Governance,and the Provision of Law and Order, with an Application To Medieval English Chartered Towns

Angelucci, Charles; Meraglia, Simone - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2013

instead low delegation never occurs. Our theory provides a rationale for the case of post-Norman Conquest England (1066 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823110

How Delegation Improves Commitment

Perino, Grischa - 2008

We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER … P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it …. In a model where delegation and specific policies are subject to the same commitment technology it is shown that McCallum …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422169