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Delegation and Rewards

Vetter, Stefan - 2012

We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427635

Delegation and rewards

Vetter, Stefan Wilhelm - 2012 - This version: 29 March 2012

We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571021

Delegation and rewards

Vetter, Stefan - 2012

We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009526172

What's the damage? : environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats

Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - 2014

environmental impact, the bureau is permitted to set its own preferred policy (optimal delegation) …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380647

What's the damage? : environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats

Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - 2014 - This Version: January 31, 2014

environmental impact, the bureau is permitted to set its own preferred policy (optimal delegation). …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338152

How delegation improves commitment

Perino, Grischa - 2008

We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER … P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it …. In a model where delegation and specific policies are subject to the same commitment technology it is shown that McCallum …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003747341

How Delegation Improves Commitment

Perino, Grischa - Alfred-Weber-Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, … - 2008

We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER … P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it …. In a model where delegation and specific policies are subject to the same commitment technology it is shown that McCallum …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200597

Delegation and Rewards

Vetter, Stefan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010540487

Delegation and Rewards

Vetter, Stefan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more subtle ways of gaining an unfair advantage. In particular, we investigate whether an implicit agreement to exchange favors between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556731

What’s the Damage? Environmental Regulation with Policy-Motivated Bureaucrats

Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014

environmental impact, the bureau is permitted to set its own preferred policy (optimal delegation). …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010813781

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