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Delegation versus Communication in the Organization of Government

Ludema, Rodney D.; Olofsgård, Anders - Georgetown University, Department of Economics - 2006

meaningful analysis of delegation versus communication with an endogenously chosen agent. The first main finding of the paper is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169606

Trade, Self-Governance,and the Provision of Law and Order, with an Application To Medieval English Chartered Towns

Angelucci, Charles; Meraglia, Simone - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2013

instead low delegation never occurs. Our theory provides a rationale for the case of post-Norman Conquest England (1066 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823110

Politics and Monetary Policy

Ehrmann, Michael; Fratzscher, Marcel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

How and why do politicians’ preferences about monetary policy differ from the interest rates set by independent central banks? Looking at the European Central Bank, the paper shows that politicians, on average, favor significantly lower interest rates. Three factors explain the different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784739

Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making

Boehmke, Frederick J.; Gailmard, Sean; Patty, John W. - EconWPA - 2005

authority to ideologically distinct bureaucratic agents; and that delegation of authority, while it takes advantage of agency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005560982

What's the damage? Environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats

Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - Centrum für angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2014

environmental impact, the bureau is permitted to set its own preferred policy (optimal delegation). …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010984546

Optimal Information Management: Organizations versus Markets

Castanheira, Micael; Leppämäki, Mikko - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

delegation, and provide novel microfoundations for the make-or-buy decision. We outline precise conditions under which giving up …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666539

Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management for Public Utilities

Martimort, D.; Sand-Zantman, W. - Université de Montpellier 3 - 2004

We propose a theory explaining the shape of contracts between local governments and the contractors they hire to run public facilities on their behalf. Governments are privately informed over the quality of the facility and risk-averse while risk-neutral contractors are subject to a moral hazard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005790523

Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship

Fiocco, Raffaele; Gilli, Mario - 2014

setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the regulator and the firm, which results in the manipulation of the … regulator's report on the firm's costs to Congress. The firm's bene.t of collusion arises from the higher price the efficient … collusion only if the regulator's bargaining power in the regulatory relationship is relatively high. Then, we derive the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371305

Hierarchical experimentation

Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2015

rationale for delegation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011421485

Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures: Theory and Evidence

Dreher, Axel; Gehring, Kai; Kotsogiannis, Christos; … - 2013

This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of government in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. Within a two-sided incomplete information principal-agent framework, it analyzes two alternative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323005