In this paper we study learning procedures when counterfactuals (payo s of not-chosen actions) are not observed. The decision maker reasons in two steps: First, she updates her propensities for each action after every payo experience, where propensity is de ned as how much she prefers each...

Child health during and after violent conflicts has been a priority for both policymakers and academics, as ill-health in early life can be impossible to make up for in later life, and has important effects on education and adult wages. In order for policy interventions to mitigate health...

We present an extension of Aumann's Agreement Theorem to the case of multiple priors. If agents update all their priors, then, for the Agreement Theorem to hold, it is sufficient to assume that they have closed, connected and intersecting sets of priors. On the other hand, if agents select the...

Insight into the homeowner’s adoption decisions in favor of a specific innovative residential heating system (RHS) helps us to understand and assess the dynamics of the adoption and diffusion of such technological systems as a “social” phenomenon. This phenomenon emerges from the...

We revisit the economic models of social learning by assuming that individuals update their beliefs in a non-Bayesian way. Individuals either overweigh or underweigh (in Bayesian terms) their private information relative to the public information revealed by the decisions of others and each...

This paper surveys some recent work in the theory of business cycles, which emphasizes the role of public news and consumer expectations as driving forces behind short-run aggregate fluctuations. The paper uses a simple two period model to introduce and discuss three issues regarding this class...

The Economics of Happiness already recognizes how procedures affect the evaluation of outcomes, although this has only been looked at within the standard framework of substantial rationality. This paper aims to go beyond that kind of approach by linking happiness and procedural rationality,...

We model a market for news where profit maximizing media outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens. We show that when information acquisition is costly, liberal (conservative) citizens find optimal to acquire information from a media outlet having a liberal...

We study a procurement auction recently analysed by Gal-Or et al. (2007). In this auction game the buyer ranks different bids on the basis of both the prices submitted and the quality of each bidder that is her private information. We emphasise the similarity between this model and existing...

We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay...