This paper studies the role of a policy of inducing in combating collusion within organizations, or in regulatory … directly with the principal in some states of the world. If collusion between supervisor and agent can occur only after they … have decided to participate in the mechanism, this can costlessly eliminate collusion. This result is robust to alternative …

incentives - "low-powered" schemes with monetary bonuses and/or incumbency rents - make collusion supportable at any discount …

We study an example of strategic delegation in Cournot duopoly and show that if contracts are both observable and … delegation equilibrium without renegotiation, which is used as a threat point. The equilibrium set includes joint profit …

appointed before the agent has chosen his action. We also show that delegation of payroll authority is suboptimal. Finally, some …

termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor, independent of contracts’ duration. When managers have …

A `collusion puzzle' exists by which, even though increasing the number of firms reduces the ability to tacitly collude …, and leads to a collapse in collusion in experimental markets with four or more firms, in natural markets there are such … authority, firms can induce more collusion by delegating production decisions to middle managers and providing suitable informal …