Showing 81 - 90 of 33,641
This paper considers the effects of an interim performance evaluation on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Assuming the agents’ outside option to be determined by market beliefs about their type, interim evaluations (a) provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293918
This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the separation of ownership and control in firms. An entrepreneur hires a worker, whose effort is necessary for running a project. The worker\'s effort determines the probability that the project will be completed on time, but the worker...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010330018
We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensationbased and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333720
Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic … effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control …, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083436
This paper considers the e effcts of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287567
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project … selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the … without task commitment and other behavioral effects the principal might forgo delegation though being efficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011816561
rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also … play then an important role in determining the costs of delegation. The main focus of the paper lies indeed in the analysis … of these costs and the consequences for whether or not delegation is optimal. We determine and characterize the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008518901
rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also … play then an important role in determining the costs of delegation. The main focus of the paper lies indeed in the analysis … of these costs and the consequences for whether or not delegation is optimal. We determine and characterize the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531633
rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also … play then an important role in determining the costs of delegation. The main focus of the paper lies indeed in the analysis … of these costs and the consequences for whether or not delegation is optimal.We determine and characterize the properties …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533994
We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensationbased and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008581228