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<Para ID="Par2">In the paper, an integrated approach for the modeling and enforcement of delegation policies in process …-aware information systems is presented. In particular, a delegation extension for process-related role-based access control (RBAC … process modeling languages with support for process-related RBAC delegation models. Moreover, the detection of delegation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011001385
results in three applications: (i) delegation to an intermediary with a different prior, the choice between centralization and … delegation, and two-way communication with an informed principal. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011003720
results in three applications: (i) delegation to an intermediary with a different prior, the choice between centralization and … delegation, and two-way communication with an informed principal. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011003906
intrapersonal, as occurs when there are endogenously changing tastes, or interpersonal where delegation is intuitionally necessay or … where decison making is 'as if' there is delegation.  This is possible if decision making is through voting - an existence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004163
hired workers or only partially delegate the task and work herself in the team. It is shown that full delegation is more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041610
each dimension, then delegation is always strictly valuable. The principal can better extract information from the agent by … using the spread between the two decisions as a costly screening device. Delegation sets no longer trade off pooling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042993
This article studies a principal-agent problem where the only commitment for the uninformed principal is to restrict the set of decisions she makes following a report by the informed agent. We show that an ex ante optimal equilibrium for the principal corresponds to a finite partition of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043000
We consider a simple real business cycle model in which shareholders hire self-interested executives to manage their firm. A generic family of compensation contracts similar to those employed in practice is studied. When compensation is convex in the firmʼs dividend, an increase in the firmʼs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043013
This paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier principal–intermediary–agent hierarchy. In … this hierarchy, monetary transfer is not feasible, delegation is made sequentially, and all players are strategic. We … characterize the optimal delegation mechanism. It is shown that the single-interval delegation a la Holmstrom is optimal only when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049733
We report findings from experiments on two delegation–communication games. An uninformed principal chooses whether to … via cheap talk to obtain decision-relevant information. In the game in which the delegation outcome is payoff-dominated by … authority and agent-subjects communicate truthfully. Significantly more choices of delegation than of communication are observed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049784